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Abstract:
Purpose: R&D and advertising have become important means to enhance the competitiveness
of  firms’ products. Design an appropriate model to help the firm to make the right choice is
value in supply chain.
Design/methodology/approach: In considering that whether the market is completely
covered or not, we build the strategy selection model for R&D and advertising for two
competing firms and solve the optimal strategy. 
Findings: The research results show that when a firm does not take any measures to enhance
competitiveness, another firm will neither. However when one takes measures to improve the
competitiveness, another will do so, also. When two firms must choose one measure to improve
the competitiveness, either in full-covered market or not full-covered market, the two firms will
not choose to do advertising in step, even if  the firms do not have to pay additional cost in
advertising.
Originality/value: In the game model, the firm could compare the own profit in different
strategies. According to the above model, the firm choose the right strategy to make the profit
maximize in a vertically differentiated market. And when the firm make the choice, it must
think about other primary elements such as market. 
Keywords: R&D, advertising, production competition, Hotelling model
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1. Introduction
Most economists believe that there are only two methods to enhance firm's competitiveness—
reform and marketing. In real life, the two methods are expressed by R&D and advertising.
Apple Corp and Samsung Corp are the leaders in the mobile phone market. There is a fierce
struggle between them. From the first generation iPhone, Apple Corp continuously improves
the performance and application of iPhone. When iPhone 5s comes out, consumers find that
the refresh rate becomes faster and faster. As the rival, Samsung Corp in order to occupy the
mobile phone market takes more and more research and innovation for the mobile phone from
the first generation Galaxy to Galaxy 4. We find that Apple Corp and Samsung Corp always pay
the money for reform and marketing to attract more consumers and occupy larger market
share. In the beverage market, Coca Cola Corp and Pepsi Corp monopolized the cola supply in
the market. Due to the uniqueness and non-substitutability of their products, they do not need
R&D but they pay more attention on the marketing. Each year, Coca Cola Corp and Pepsi Corp
will pay much money to launch a new and interesting advertisement to attract consumers. 
R&D and advertising can increase consumer’s loyalty, and improve the influence in the market
and so on. Sosa (2009) proposes that the necessary conditions for R&D are technology and
application. The basic research shows that technology with R&D can help the firm cross the
market and the application with R&D can help the firm to keep the competitive advantage. This
finding is extended to consider the influence of R&D for the next generation product or the new
product in the market by Ofek and Sarvary (2003), Dutta, Narasimhan and Rajiv (1999). Baye
and Morgan (2009) model a homogeneous product environment where identical e-retailers
endogenously engage in both brand advertising and price advertising. They find that in
equilibrium, branding (1) reduces firm profits; (2) increases prices paid by loyalty and
shoppers, and (3) reduces the information value provided by comparison sites. Anderson and
Simester (2013) consider that the model of competition predicts that firms will sell less when
competitors target their customers with advertising. They compare how these positive
spillovers vary across product categories to illustrate the importance of product standards,
customer learning, and switching costs. The findings have the potential to change our
understanding of competition in mature markets. Gardete (2013) considers a cheap-talk model
in which a firm has a chance to communicate its product quality to consumers. The model
describes how advertising can be both informative to consumers and profitable for the firm
through its content, in a vertically differentiated market.
The input of R&D and advertising has a close relationship with the profit of the firms in future,
which means more input more profit. The resource of the firm is limited, so the firm must
consider the return of investment. Many scholars compare the influence of R&D and
advertising. Steenkamp and Fang (2011) think about the critical role of R&D and advertising in
the marketing strategy of the firm. Then they conceptually and empirically examine why and
how much the effectiveness of these two marketing instruments differs between times of
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economic expansions versus periods of economic contractions—and whether these results
depend on the cyclicality of the industry. These findings provide valuable and actionable
insights into how firms should respond to contractions in order to increase profits and market
share. Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009) investigate the impact of rivals’ product innovation and
new advertising on a firm’s financial market value in mature product markets. They find that
the effect of new advertising is channeled through market size dynamics, while that of product
innovation operates through market share dynamics. Grossmann (2008) develops a quality-
ladder model of endogenous growth to study the interplay between in-house R&D and
combative advertising expenditure, and its implications for economic growth, firm size, and
welfare. They find that first, if firms incur higher sunk costs for marketing, concentration and
firm size rise. Second, firm size and R&D expenditure are positively related as larger firms are
able to offset R&D costs through higher sales. The analysis also suggests that R&D subsidies
are conducive to R&D and growth without inducing firms to raise advertising outlays. Mizik and
Jacobson (2003) consider that firms allocate their limited resources between two fundamental
processes of creating value and appropriating value. They address this issue by examining the
effect that shifts in strategic emphasis have on stock return. They find that the stock market
reacts favorably when a firm increases its emphasis on value appropriation relative to value
creation.
This paper analyzes that the two competing firms have a unique product competing in the
market and in order to enhance the competitiveness, they must make the choice for R&D and
advertising with the limited capital. This paper examines two cases markets i.e. full-covered
market (Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola) and not full-covered market (Apple and Samsung), and
discuss that which choice is the optimal strategy in the different types of the market.
Interesting findings are that even advertising without cost, too much advertising would bring a
reduction of the profits for two competing firms and make the firms in a disadvantage
situation. In the full-covered market and not full-covered market, the optimal choices for two
firms maybe same or different.
2. Model and Analysis
In this section, we develop a model with two competing firms A and B, each with a competing
product. In order to improve their market competitiveness and scale, the firms need to invest
on reform and marketing in terms of, R&D and advertising. These two methods will increase
the consumers’ utility to bring more sales for firms. We use the demand model presented by
Hotelling (1929). We assume that firm A and firm B are located at a distance in the market,
the distance is M. When the value of M is small, which means that the competition is intense.
We think about two cases for the market: (1) the full-covered market, the consumer will buy
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the product from one firm, see Figure 1; (2) the not full-covered market, the consumer can
buy nothing from two firms, see Figure 2. 
Figure 1. The full-covered market
Where yi is the consumer’s preference distance when buy the product from firm i, i ϵ (A,B),
and the market demand for firm is qi = yi.
Figure 2. The not full-covered market
Where xi is the consumer’s preference distance outside the two firms and the market demand
for firm i is qi = Si = xi + yi.
We assume that the reservation price for consumer is R, t is the transport cost and pi is the
price. For the convenience of calculation, we reference Xu, Gurnani and Desiraju (2010)
hypothesis t = 1. So when a consumer buys the product, his utility is:
iii pdRdU )(
Next we consider the consumer’s utility with R&D or advertising. When the firm i invests on
R&D, the investment cost is 
2
2
ie  and the increasing consumer’s utility is ei. So the consumer’s
utility changes to: 
iiii epdRdU )(
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When firm i advertises, the advertising will bring the increasing utility θNi for consumer, where
Ni is the number of consumers buying the product from firm i, and θ is the effect parameter of
the advertising. So the consumer’s utility changes to:
iiii NpdRdU )(
For firm i, when it makes R&D, the profit function is 
2
2
i
iii
eqp  ; when it makes advertisement,
the profit function is πi = piqi – F. We assume that firm has the limited fund and capital so it
has to choose only one measure to improve the competitiveness at one time. In further, we
assume that advertising without additional cost with two main reasons: first, in real life,
advertising has become the most important means of marketing strategy. Therefore each firm
has a fixed cost of advertising in market expenditure. Secondly, we think that the firm use the
advertisement to instill an idea to its consumers such as Sony Corp uses the advertisement to
let the consumers know that PS2 can be achieved on the online game function with the same
firm product; Samsung Corp advertises that the consumers with Galaxy 4 can send and
achieve the consumer’s information without network or cost and the consumers with Note 3
can use the mobile phone’s screen to achieve the joint synchronization function. These
advertisements use the theory that in the market a consumer will get extra utility from
purchasing products when he knows more consumers are using the same product as him. 
In this paper we introduce two types of market as full-covered market and not full-covered
market. The first market means that each consumer buys one unit of the product from either
of the two firms when the two firms occupy the whole market. The second market means that
the consumer can buy the product from others firms outside the two firms. We discuss the
optimal strategy for the competing firms when they face the choice of R&D and advertising in
the two kinds of the market. The paper will research the problem on three ways: (1) in the two
types market only R&D or no action can be chosen; (2) in the two types market only
advertising or no action can be chosen; and (3) in the two types market, the firms must
choose an action between R&D and advertising. This paper would discuss the above three
circumstances for two firms with the competing product in the market and solve the optimal
strategy. Assume that the two firms choose the strategy and price simultaneously without
leader or follower. 
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2.1. The Firms Just Choose R&D or No Action
When the firms just can increase the consumer’s utility by R&D, the firms can choose R&D or
no action, the profits for the firms are listed in Table 1:
Firm B
R O
Firm A
R π jA
RR , π jB
RR π jA
R0 , π jB
R0
O π jA
0R , π jB
0R π jA
00 , π jB
00
Table 1. The profits with R&D or no action
Where Tji is the profit for firm i in mark j choosing strategy T, i ϵ (A,B), j ϵ (F,D) and
T ϵ {(0,0), (R,0), (0,R), (R,R)}. Then F represents the full covered market and D represents
the not full-covered market. R is denoted the firm choosing R&D and 0 is denoted the firm
having no action. Further, we use the abbreviations RR to denote the strategy for two firms,
the first (second) letter denoting the action for firm A (firm B). 
By the Hotelling model, we can get the demand function in the full-covered market (see
Appendix 1a), and get the profits for the two firms as follows:
RR
FB
RR
FA M   2/
2
0
22
0
128
49
16
9 R
FB
R
FA
MM
 
R
FB
R
FA
MM 0220
16
9
128
49
 
RR
FB
RR
FA
M
 
9
4 2
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We also get the demand function for two firms in not full-covered market (see Appendix 1b),
and the profits as follows:
RR
DB
RR
DA RM  
2)2(
50
3
0
22
0
256328
)2(5043
716
)2(147 R
DB
R
DA
RMRM
 




R
DB
R
DA
RMRM 0220
716
)2(147
256328
)2(5043
 




RR
DB
RR
DA
RM
 


5329
)2(537 2
To analyze the above results, we can get the optimal strategy for two firms in the full-covered
market and not full-covered market.
Proposition 1. In the two kinds (full-covered and not full-covered) of the market, if firm A
and firm B just can choose R&D or no action, both firms doing R&D is the Nash equilibrium.
In the full-covered market, the two firms play the game and get the result in prisoner dilemma
problem: the profits for the two firms choosing R&D are less than that for both no actions
( 00
22
29
4
Fi
RR
Fi
MM
  ). By doing R&D, firms expect to increase the utility for consumers
buying the product, occupy more market share and gain greater profits. But with the result
from the calculations, we find that when two firms both choose R&D simultaneously, they will
pay the same level of effort 
3
Mee BA  . And we get 
00
i
RR
i pp   and 
00
i
RR
i qq   (see Appendix
2a). It means that when two firms both choose R&D, the increasing consumer’s utility has no
effect for price and sales. The firms have to pay some cost for R&D, so the total profit is not
increasing but decreasing 00Fi
RR
Fi   . When one firm chooses R&D and another chooses no
action, the firm with no action will lose some market share, it drives another firm to reduce the
price to seize the market and the profit for another firm is decreasing. Another firm doesn’t
want to see the bad result for itself, so it will do R&D, too. So in the full-covered market, even
the two firms could get more profits in strategy 00, strategy RR is the unique Nash equilibrium
strategy.
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In the not full-covered market, the profits for the two firms choosing R&D are more than that
for both no actions ( πDi
RR=537(M+2R )
2
5329
> 3(M+2R )
2
50
=πDi
00 ). Because when the firm chooses
R&D, the utility of the consumer will increase, the firm can price highly. The market is not
completely covered, the increasing for the price does not sacrifice the sales as condition, and
the product sales also increase. In this case, even the firm must pay a certain cost for R&D,
the ultimate profit is increasing. So in the not full-covered market, the firms can get more
profits by R&D and both R&D is the Nash equilibrium solution.
So in the two kinds of the market, the two firms will both choose R&D to keep the competitive,
even sometimes R&D will sacrifice the profit. The two firms both do R&D to develop the
product in the market which is good for the consumers. 
2.2. The Firms Just Choose Advertisement or No Action
When the firms just can increase the consumer’s utility by advertising, the firms can choose
advertising or no action, the profits for the firms are listed in Table 2:
Firm B
A O
Firm A
A
AA
jA ,
AA
jB
0A
jA ,
0A
jB
O
A
jA
0 , AjB
0 00jA ,
00
jB
Table 2. The profits with advertising or no action
Where Tji is the profit for firm i in market j choosing strategy H, i ϵ (A,B) , j ϵ (F,D) and
H ϵ {(0,0), (A,0), (0,A), (A,A)}. A is denoted that the firm chooses advertising and 0 is
denoted that the firm has no action. Further, we use the abbreviations A A to denote the
strategy for two firms, and the first (second) letter to denote the action for firm A (firm B). 
By the Hotelling model, we can get the demand function in the full-covered market (see
Appendix 1c), and get the profits for the two firms as follows:
00200 2/ FBFA M  
0
2222
0
)2(9
)23(
)2(9
)3( A
FB
A
FA
MM





 






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A
FB
A
FA
MM 02220
)2(9
)3(
)2(9
)23(





 






AA
FB
AA
FA
M


 


2
)1(2
We also get the demand function for two firms in not full-covered market (see Appendix 1d),
and the profits as follows:
00200 )2(
50
3
DBDA RM  
A
DB
A
DA
RMRM 0
22
22
0
)83535)(1)(2(
)2()37)(23(



 



0
22
22
0
)83535)(2(
)2()47)(3( A
DB
A
DA
RMRM



 



AA
DB
AA
DA
MRM



 



)1(50
)2(3 2
To analyze the above results, we can get the optimal strategy for two firms in the full-covered
market and not full-covered market.
Proposition 2. In the full-covered market, whatever another firm chooses advertising or not,
the optimal choice for one firm is no action.
Through the proposition 1, we know in the full-covered market, even if R&D brings a certain
cost, the optimal choice for two firms is choosing R&D simultaneously still. People think that if
advertising is no cost (F = 0), both firms choosing advertising must be the optimal choice for
them. But we can get 00Fi
AA
Fi    from the calculation that no action for both firms is Nash
equilibrium. The reason is that although advertising can improve the consumption utility of
consumers, the impact by advertising on price is uncertain. Advertising will produce two
interactions on price: one is that advertising makes the price increase, because of the utility of
consumers increasing; another is that advertising makes the price decrease, because of the
good value increasing and demand increasing. In other words, when one firm advertising for
increasing the good value and demand, because the market is full-covered, its increasing
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demand is grabbed from its rival. Rival with market share dropping is more willing to reduce
price to attract more consumers. Because there is no additional cost for advertising in this
paper, one firm will increase the intensity of advertising more and more, another firm will
reduce the price in order to attract consumers. These actions of two firms make the
competition based on price more and more intense, so that the profits for two firms will
reduce. When two firms both take the advertisement which affects each other, they will have
the strong power to continuously reduce the price to snatch the market share and finally their
profit is less than that under another three strategies. By calculation results we will get the
prof i ts order of two f irms in d i f ferent strategies as 0000 FA
A
FA
A
FA
AA
FA    and
0000
FB
A
FB
A
FB
AA
FB   .
The market is fully covered that is an especially important condition for Proposition 2. It makes
that the firm gets the additional demand from its rival. With losing the market share, the rival
will take response to reduce the competitive price to attract more consumers. In the following
discussion, we will show the different result by advertising in the not full-covered market.
In the not full-covered market, we know that the market share is different with the market
demand. Through calculating, we get the optimal strategy about parameters θ and R for firm i,
the optimal strategy as shown below in Figure 3:
Figure 3. Optimal strategy under not full-covered market
As can be seen from the figure, when the reservation price R and advertising influence
parameter θ are small, two firms doing no action simultaneously is the only Nash equilibrium
solution. Because when the two parameters are small, the profits of two firms change small.
The little change will not affect the firms' choice. When the reservation price R is larger
enough, two firms both take the advertisement that is the Nash equilibrium solution. Through
the above analysis, we can get proposition 3 as follows:
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Proposition 3. In the not full-covered market, if the reservation price R is high enough, two
firms will choose advertising simultaneously whatever the value of θ is.
The above analysis shows that when the two firms take advertising, due to the full-covered
market and the intense competition, the firms must reduce the price with the demand no
change. So the profits for two firms will decrease. Next we consider the case that under the
not full-covered market, the two firms both choose the advertisement. We find 0

R
pi , 0


ip ,
0
R
qi  and 0


iq  (see Appendix 2b). From the above results we can see that with the
increasing of parameter R and θ, the product demand will increase; and the price is increasing
when the consumer’s reservation price increases and decreasing when the advertising
influence parameter increases. When the reservation price R is large enough, no matter how
value of θ between 0 and 1, the influence of θ on price is far lower than that of R on price, so
the price will increase when R is large enough. Therefore, when the consumer’s reservation
price R is large enough, the two firms would choose advertising. With the increasing of the
price and the demand, the profits of the two firms will increase eventually. Note that this case
just occurs in the not full-covered market, because the increased demand by advertising
comes from the external market outside the two firms, rather than through snatching rival’s
market share to achieve.
2.3. In two kinds of market, the firm must choose one action to improve the
competitive power—R&D or advertising.
When the firms must increase the consumer’s utility by choosing R&D or advertising, the
profits for the firms are listed in the Table 3:
Firm B
A R
Firm A
A
AA
jA ,
AA
jB
AR
jA ,
AR
jB
R
RA
jA ,
RA
jB
RR
jA ,
RR
jB
Table 3. The profits with R&D or advertising
Where Kji  is the profit for firm i in market j choosing strategy K, i ϵ (A,B) , j ϵ (F,D) and
K ϵ {(A,A), (A,R), (R,A), (R,R)}. A is denoted that the firm chooses advertising and R is
denoted that the firm chooses R&D. Further, we use the abbreviations AA to denote the
strategy for two firms, and the first (second) letter to denote the action for firm A (firm B). 
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Because we have given the related profits when two firms choose pure strategies AA and RR.
The following we will list the profits of one firm taking R&D and another taking advertising.
Demand function about the two cases is in Appendix 1e and 1f.
When the market is full-covered, 
RA
FB
AR
FA
M



 


 2
22
)916(
)37)(2(
AR
FB
RA
FA
M



 



916
)23( 22
When the market is not full-covered,
RA
DB
AR
DA
RMRM



 


 2432
22
)322889511363716)(1(
)83741()2)(23)(2(
AR
DB
RA
DA
RMRM



 



)322889511363716)(1(
)2()47)(3(
432
22
Analyze the above results, we will get proposition 4 as follows:
Proposition 4. When the firm must take action to improve the competitiveness, whatever in
the full-covered market or not full-covered market, it would not happen that two firms both
choose advertising.
In the full-covered market, we compare the profits in different strategies and get strategy RR
is unique Nash equilibrium solution. In the front, we have discussed strategy RR and strategy
AA, and know under the full-covered market, strategy AA is not Nash equilibrium solution. By
comparing strategy RR and strategy AA, we know that in these strategies, each firm’s market
share has no change, but the price of the product in strategy R R is larger than that in
strategy AA. Next we will discuss the related profit of two firms in strategy AA, strategy RA
and strategy AR. Strategy R A represents the symmetric case of strategy AR, and thus,
without loss of generality, we omit the discussion of strategy R A to avoid redundancy. In
strategy AR, one firm takes advertisement and another takes R&D which makes the value of
products increase. Because one firm doesn’t pay the extra cost for advertising, it would
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continue to strengthen the advertising to increase the value of products and grab more market
share. The market is fully-covered, one firm only grabs the market share from another firm. In
this situation the competing firm in order to keep its market shared, must pay more money on
R&D. The competition would become intense and the price of the product will decrease. But
this competition is not intense infinitely because R&D has the cost. The firm taking R&D will
consider the profit and the cost at the same time. This reason weakens and restrains the
competition in the market. So the profits of two firms in strategy AR will be greater than that
in strategy AA. Comparing strategy AR and strategy AA, the former is better for firms. So in
the full-covered market, the two firms will not choose the advertising simultaneously.
In the not full-covered market, we get the optimal strategy about parameter R and θ in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The optimal strategy in not full-covered market
It can be seen that when θ closes to 1, strategy AR (or strategy RA) is the Nash equilibrium
solution for two firms. In the not full-covered market, when the firm takes the advertisement,
the additional market demand would occupy from the market outside the two firms rather than
at the expense of reducing price. The market demand and the price may increase at the same
time which is related to θ. From the figure we can see that no matter how the parameters R and
θ change, strategy AA will not be the Nash equilibrium solution for two firms. Because when
two firms take the advertisement simultaneously, the advertisement effect parameter θ is the
same. In order to get more profit, they will reduce the price to get more market share which
intensifies the competition in the market, so their profits will decrease. In strategy RR, the effect
of R&D is related to the cost of each firm’s R&D; and in strategy AR, ei and θ are different. So
strategy R R and strategy A R would be the Nash equilibrium solution for two firms with the
change of R and θ. Strategy AA is never the Nash equilibrium solution under not full-covered
market. 
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3. Conclusion
In this paper we establish a model that the two competing firms choose the different measures
to increase their competitiveness, where the different choice will have affect on the price. We
analyze two cases of market-full-covered market and not full-covered market. From the
research we find that two competing firms often take the same action such as take no action
simultaneously or take some investment to improve the utility of the consumers
simultaneously. We find that whether in full-covered market or not full-covered market, it is
not a Nash equilibrium solution that a firm takes the action to improve the product value,
another takes no action. To calculate simply we think advertisement insertion has no extra cost
for the network externality propaganda. People would think since advertising can increase the
utility of the consumer, it is better to take more advertisement. But the study finds that in the
full-covered market when firms just can choose advertisement or no action, the two firms
don’t choose advertising simultaneously. Because advertising will increase the competition in
the market, with the intense competition the two firms’ profits will decrease. Since the
development of the economy and technology, two firms must take some investment to
improve the competitiveness. We find that under this situation two firms both advertising is
not the Nash equilibrium still regardless of full-covered market or not full-covered market.
In this paper we assume using the advertisement to public the net work externality
propaganda with no extract cost; competing firms just facing two choices; and the competing
firms without cooperation. In future research, we will further study more conditions which are
not involved in this paper, such as the two competing firms join an alliance to make R&D or
advertising. Hope that these researches could help on researching the competing firms in the
market.
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Appendix 1
a. The demand functions in the full-covered market just R&D：
2
00 AB
FA
ppMq  , 
2
00 BA
FB
ppMq  , 
2
0 AABR
FA
eppMq  , 
2
0 ABAR
FB
eppMq  , 
2
BAABRR
FA
eeppMq  , 
2
ABBARR
FB
eeppMq 
b. The demand functions in the not full-covered market just R&D：
2
3200 AB
DA
ppRMq  , 
2
3200 BA
DB
ppRMq  , 
2
3320 AABR
DA
eppRMq  , 
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2
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2
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eeppRMq  , 
2
332 ABBARR
DB
eeppRMq 
c. The demand functions in the full-covered market just advertisement：
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d. The demand functions in the not full-covered market just advertisement：
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e. The demand functions in the full-covered market with R&D or advertisement：
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f. The demand functions in the not full-covered market with R&D or advertisement:
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Appendix 2
a. In full-covered market, the price and the demand in Strategy 00 and Strategy AA
MpFi 
00 , MpRRFi  , 2/
00 MqFi  , 2/Mq
RR
Fi 
b. Sensitivity analysis for price and demand
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